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The Politics of Historical Economics: 
Wilhelm Roscher on Democracy, Socialism and Caesarism 
 
Wilhelm Friedrich Georg Roscher (1817-94) has not been treated particularly kindly by 
posterity.  He is perhaps best remembered as one of the many targets of Karl Marx’s 
unsparing sarcasm in Capital, a work in which Marx condemned “Herr Thucydides Roscher” 
as a leading exemplar of the uncritical, bourgeois political economy of the German 
professorial establishment.1  Roscher’s other claim to fame is that he invented, or at least 
popularised, the term “Enlightened absolutism.”  Yet although this label once occupied a 
prominent place in scholarly accounts of eighteenth-century monarchical culture, recent work 
has dismissed its usefulness as a historical category.2  Roscher’s larger significance is usually 
held to lie in his call for the application of the “historical method” to political economy, as set 
out in the famous Preface to his 1843 Grundriß zu Vorlesungen über die Staatswirthschaft.  
On that view, his work marks an important methodological turning-point in the history of 
economic thought, signalling a break with the supposedly abstract, unhistorical and 
cosmopolitan perspectives of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and inaugurating the 
historicist outlook of the “German Historical School of Economics.”3  Nevertheless, even this 
                                            
1  Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume 1, intro. by Ernst Mandel, 
trans. Ben Fowkes (London, 1990), 485, n.  
2  On “absolutism” in nineteenth-century German thought, see Reinhard Blänkner, 
“Absolutismus”. Eine begriffsgeschichtliche Studie zur politischen Theorie und zur 
Geschichtswissenschaft in Deutschland, 1830-1870 (Frankfurt am Main, 2011); see also 
Derek Beales, “Philosophical kingship and enlightened despotism,” in Mark Goldie and 
Robert Wokler, eds., The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought 
(Cambridge, 2006), 497-524. 
3  Bruno Hildebrand drew an influential contrast between Smith’s “abstract” rationalism 
(which Hildebrand associated with the Enlightenment, and with Rousseau and Kant), and his 
own conception of a historically-grounded economics that would be sensitive to cultural and 
national contexts; see Bruno Hildebrand, Die Nationalökonomie der Gegenwart und der 
Zukunft (Franfurt am Main, 1848), 27-29.  For a modern variant of the argument, see Walter 
J. Fischel, “Der Historismus in der Wirtschaftswissenschaft. Dargestellt an der Entwicklung 
von Adam Müller bis Bruno Hildebrand,” Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und 
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way of construing Roscher’s intellectual significance has come to seem unpersuasive.  Recent 
commentators have questioned the innovativeness of the much-vaunted “historical method,” 
while some have even been inclined to abandon the label of the “Historical School of 
Economics” altogether, noting that Roscher’s ideas were continuous with the main thrust of 
German economics since the 1790s.4 
 
Why, then, should intellectual historians be interested in Roscher’s work today?  This article 
attempts to answer this question by reconstructing his evolving perspective on the rise of 
democracy in nineteenth-century Europe.  In particular, the article explores Roscher’s 
concern that Europe’s economically-advanced societies, characterised by an unstable 
combination of democratic sovereignty, deep socio-economic inequality, and a centralised 
state apparatus, would soon find themselves at the mercy of what he originally called 
“military tyranny” and later redescribed as “Caesarism.”  The latter term became central to 
political thought after 1848 as theorists grappled with the possibility that Europe’s large 
military states, combining pseudo-democratic politics with centralised authoritarian 
                                            
Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 47 (1960), 1-31. For comment, see Emma Rothschild, “Bruno 
Hildebrands Kritik an Adam Smith,” in Bertram Schefold, ed., Bruno Hildebrands ‘Die 
Nationalökonomie der Gegenwart und Zukunft’: Vademecum zu einer Klassiker der 
Stufenlehren (Düsseldorf, 1998), 133-71. 
4  For authoritative discussion see Keith Tribe, Governing Economy: The Reformation of 
German Economic Discourse 1750-1840 (Cambridge, 1988), 203-09; Tribe, “Historical 
economics, the Methodenstreit, and the economics of Max Weber,” in Tribe, Strategies of 
Economic Order: German Economic Discourse 1750-1950 (Cambridge, 1995) 66-94; Heath 
Pearson, “Was there really a German Historical School of Economics?,” History of Political 
Economy, 31 (1999), 547-62; cf. Bruce Caldwell, “There Really Was a German Historical 
School of Economics: A Comment on Heath Pearson,” History of Political Economy, 33 
(2001), 649-54. On Roscher’s place within a longer tradition of the German sciences of state 
see David F. Lindenfeld, The Practical Imagination: The German Sciences of State in the 
Nineteenth Century (Chicago, 1997).  See also Birger P. Priddat, “Intention and Failure of W. 
Roscher’s Historical Method of National Economics,” in Peter Koslowski, ed. The Theory of 
Ethical Economy in the Historical School (Berlin, 1995), 15-34; Yukihiro Ikeda, “A lecture 
notebook of Wilhelm Roscher with special reference to his published works,” in The German 
Historical School: The historical and ethical approach to economics, ed. Yuichi Shionoya 
(London, 2002), 35-53. 
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leadership, might default into imperial regimes analogous to those of ancient Rome or, more 
recently, the first Napoleonic Empire.5  Caesarism loomed especially large in Germany 
throughout the period of the Kaiserreich, where the subject intersected with questions about 
democratic representation, imperialism and Weltpolitik, and the possibility of forging a stable 
constitutionalist alternative to British parliamentarism and French republicanism.6  This 
article shows that Roscher’s own contributions to the debates of the 1880s and 1890s formed 
parts of a sustained, comparative and historical investigation into the future of democracy that 
stretched back to the 1840s.  It underlines the ways in which he brought the resources of 
classical Greek and Roman thought to bear on his analysis of modern politics, and sketches 
his comparative assessment of democracy’s prospects in Britain, France and the United 
States.7  At the same time, my argument has a number of wider implications for 
understanding how German liberals confronted popular sovereignty, burgeoning social 
inequality and modern state power throughout the entire period between Vormärz and the 
Kaiserreich.  Most importantly, Roscher’s example helps to deepen our understanding of the 
extent to which German perceptions of the “social question,” and connected debates about 
liberal imperialism, related to wider European anxieties about mass politics and the threat of 
                                            
5  See especially Heinz Gollwitzer, “Der Cäsarismus Napoleons III. im Widerhall der 
öffentlichen Meinung Deutschlands, Historische Zeitschrift, 173 (1952), 23-75; English trans. 
as Gollwitzer, “The Caesarism of Napoleon III as seen by public opinion in Germany,” trans. 
Gordon C. Wells, Economy and Society, 16 (1987), 357-404; Dieter Groh, “Cäsarismus, 
Napoleonismus, Bonapartismus, Führer, Chef, Imperialismus,” in Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe, eds. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, 9 vols. (Stuttgart, 
1972-1995), vol. 1, 726-71; Peter Baehr, Caesar and the Fading of the Roman World: A 
Study in Republicanism and Caesarism (New Brunswick, NJ., 1998); Peter Baehr and Melvin 
Richter, eds., Dictatorship in History and Theory (Cambridge, 2004). 
6  Mark Hewitson, National identity and political thought in Germany: Wilhelmine depictions 
of the French Third Republic 1890 – 1914 (Oxford, 2000); see also Marcus Llanque, 
Demokratisches Denken im Krieg: Die deutsche Debatte im Ersten Weltkrieg (Berlin, 2000). 
7  An excellent starting point for understanding Roscher’s engagement with classical Greek 
history, historiography and philosophy is Neville Morley, “Thucydides, history and 
historicism in Wilhelm Roscher,” in Katherine Harloe and Neville Morley, eds., Thucydides 
and the Modern World: Reception, Reinterpretation and Influence from the Renaissance to 
the Present (Cambridge, 2012), 115-39. 
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Caesarist rule.8  The article thus sets Roscher’s thought outside the relatively narrow 
parameters adopted in specialist histories of economic thought, and argues that his 
methodological pronouncements about political economy were subordinate to a more 
ambitious effort to forge a science of politics capable of meeting the distinctive challenges 
posed by democracy.  This points the way towards my central conclusion, which is that 
conventional depictions of Roscher as a German “historical economist” ultimately fail to 
capture his significance as a political thinker. 
 
 
I 
 
In order to see the centrality of politics to Roscher’s intellectual enterprise, it is necessary to 
begin by considering the famous passages in which he formulated his approach to 
Staatswirthschaft.9  The standard reference-points in the scholarship are the Foreword and 
Introduction to his 1843 Grundriß zu Vorlesungen über die Staatswirthschaft, the text-book 
accompanying his lectures at the University of Göttingen, where he had been trained and took 
up his first academic appointment.  It was in these sections of the Grundriß that Roscher 
made his famous call for a reorientation of Staatswirthschaft on the basis of the “historical 
method,” citing the earlier innovations in the historical study of jurisprudence made by 
                                            
8  For related discussion, see Eric Grimmer-Solem, The Rise of Historical Economics and 
Social Reform in Germany 1864-1894 (Oxford, 2003); Matthew P. Fitzpatrick, Liberal 
Imperialism in Germany: Expansionism and Nationalism, 1848-1884 (New York and Oxford, 
2008), 59-61; Jens-Uwe Guettel, German Expansionism, Imperial Liberalism, and the United 
States, 1776-1945 (Cambridge, 2012). 
9  The term Staatswirthschaft was not a precise equivalent to Nationalökonomie, and cannot 
be directly equated with the English term “political economy.”  Roscher’s usage of 
Staatswirthschaft corresponded with that of his Göttingen predecessor, Georg Sartorius.  
Nevertheless, I will occasionally translate Staatswirthschaft as political economy in 
preference to “state economy.”  On these terminological distinctions, see Tribe, Governing 
Economy, 149-82.  
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Friedrich Carl von Savigny and Karl Friedrich Eichhorn.10  The basic point that he sought to 
impress on his readers – most of whom would have been students enrolled on his lecture 
course – was that the laws of economics were not timeless axioms, but were rooted in the real 
life of specific peoples at specific stages of their development.  For that reason, 
Staatswirthschaft had to form an alliance with legal, political and cultural history (Rechts-, 
Staats- und Kulturgeschichte).11  He had already made similar points in his 1842 review of 
List’s National System, in which he claimed that competence in political economy required 
thorough knowledge of the history of “peoples and states.”12  Yet despite his insistence on the 
significance of the “historical method,” recent commentators like Tribe and Pearson have 
discerned little that was truly novel in this emphasis on the historicity of economic 
relationships.13 
 
While this emphasis on the “historical method” has absorbed most attention from historians 
of economic thought, it is crucial to underline several other aspects of Roscher’s conception 
of Staatswirthschaft.  The most prominent of these was his insistence that Staatswirthschaft 
was a “political science” (politische Wissenschaft) that pertained to the judgement 
(beurtheilen) and rule (beherrschen) of human beings. Political economy was far more than a 
simple “chrematistics,” or art of acquisition; as the terms “judgement” and “rule” imply, it 
was crucially connected to government.14  In making these claims, Roscher was, of course, 
                                            
10  Wilhelm Roscher, Grundriß zu Vorlesungen über die Staatswirthschaft. Nach 
geschichtlicher Methode (Göttingen, 1843), v.   
11  Roscher, Grundriß, iv.  
12  Wilhelm Roscher, [review of] “Friedrich List, Das national System der politischen 
Ökonomie. Erster Band: der internationale Handel, die Handelspolitik und der deutsche 
Zollverein,” Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen, 118 (1842), 1177-1216, at 1178. 
13  Tribe, “Historical Economics”; Pearson, “Was there really a German Historical School of 
Economics?” 
14  Roscher, Grundriß, iv. A similar perspective is adopted in Wilhelm Roscher, Leben, Werk 
und Zeitalter des Thukydides. Mit einer Einleitung zur Aesthetik der historischen Kunst 
überhaupt (Göttingen, 1842), vii.  
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echoing the famous theory of household management (oikonomia) set out in book 1 of 
Aristotle’s Politics, where Aristotle had claimed that “household management attends more 
to men than to the acquisition of inanimate things, and to human excellence more than to the 
excellence of property which we call wealth, and to the excellence of freemen more than to 
the excellence of slaves.”15  Traces of this Aristotelian conception of Staatswirthschaft 
appeared in many of Roscher’s other writings of the 1840s and beyond.  In the 1842 review 
of List he used almost the same words, stressing that Staatswirthschaft was an “ethical 
science” concerned with human views and needs, and with the judgement (beurtheilen) and 
rule (beherrschen) of human beings.  He went on to emphasise that Staatswirthschaft had 
both a political and economic component, and insisted on the need to keep both elements 
simultaneously in view.  While the ancients had overvalued the political component, the task 
facing the moderns was to redress a dangerous underestimation of the “political” – a tendency 
he associated above all with Jean-Baptiste Say, David Ricardo and the American political 
economist, Thomas Cooper.16  Similarly, in his 1849 lecture “On the Relationship of 
Nationalökonomie to Classical Antiquity” he praised Socrates, Aristotle and Xenophon for 
recognising Nationalökonomie as an “ethical science.”17 
 
Roscher also insisted that Staatswirthschaft, properly understood, had a crucial role to play in 
maintaining the stability of modern states.  This was not so much because of its concrete 
prescriptions, but because it promoted, more generally, a kind of political education (Bildung 
                                            
15  Aristotle, The Politics and the Constitution of Athens, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge, 
1996), 28 (12509b - bk. 1, ch. 13). 
16  Roscher, Review of List, 1178-80. Cooper was a significant target, since he had explicitly 
argued that politics “are not essentially a part of Political Economy.”  See Thomas Cooper, 
Lectures on the Elements of Political Economy (Columbia, SC., 1826), 15-16.  
17  Wihelm Roscher, “Ueber das Verhältniss der Nationalökonomie zum klassischen 
Alterthume,” Berichte über die Verhandlungen der königlich-sächsischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaft zu Leipzig. Philologisch-historische Classe, 1 (1849), 115-34 (here at 120).  
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des politischen Sinnes).18  He further underlined the practical significance of 
Nationalökonomie in his 1849 lecture on political economy and classical antiquity, delivered 
in the wake of the 1848-49 revolutions across continental Europe.  Here he stressed the 
“significance of this science for our present and future,” and noted that “the existence of our 
entire culture depends on the correct understanding [Ergründung] and general spread of 
political-economic truth.”19  According to Roscher, one of the causes of Britain’s political 
stability in the late 1840s was the teaching of Nationalökonomie in schools and colleges.  
This meant that Britain was likely to remain exempt from the revolutionary instabilities 
afflicting France and other continental European states.20 
 
It is important to stress that Roscher’s political orientation did not entail a radical break with 
the classical political economy of Adam Smith.  It is true that he sought to reverse what he 
took to be the impoverishment of political economy in the early nineteenth century, and he 
explicitly accused Say, Ricardo and Cooper of reducing political economy to the study of 
“material relationships” and of losing sight of mankind’s social and spiritual needs 
(Bedürfnisse).21  Yet these accusations did not apply to Smith himself.  This point is amply 
demonstrated in the review of List, in which Roscher, while endorsing List’s work as the best 
practical defence of the Zollverein as the basis of Germany’s future unification, rejected 
List’s own caricature of Smith as a cosmopolitical economist who paid insufficient attention 
to questions of politics, nationality or history.22  Rather, he argued, Smith had incisively 
discussed the different “developmental stages” (Entwicklungsstufen) in the history of wage-
                                            
18  Roscher, Grundriß, 2.  
19  Roscher, “Ueber das Verhaltniss,” 116.  
20  Roscher, “Ueber das Verhaltniss,” 116.  
21  Roscher, Review of List, 1179. 
22  Roscher, Review of List, 1214-6.  For comment, see especially Keith Tribe, “Die Vernunft 
des List. National economy and the critique of cosmopolitical economy,” in Tribe, Strategies 
of Economic Order, 32-65.   
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labour, analysed the various types of colony, and had recognised the political significance of 
the division of labour.23  In the later System der Volkswirtschaft (1854), Roscher also cited 
Smith’s praise of the Navigation Acts and his famous claim that defence was of “much more 
importance than opulence” as evidence of the Scotsman’s attentiveness to questions of 
nationality and national power.24  Seen from that perspective, Roscher’s formulation of the 
scope of Staatswirthschaft in the 1840s and 1850s had little in common with List’s or 
Hildebrand’s far more critical denigrations of Smithian political economy.  Rather, Roscher is 
best viewed as seeking to revive a more integrated view of politics and economics which he 
associated primarily with Aristotle – and, to some extent, with Smith himself – against the 
truncated, materialistic orientation of Ricardo, Say and Cooper. 
 
 
II 
 
A further point about the primacy of politics in Roscher’s thought can be made by situating 
his writings against the traditions of historical scholarship and Staatswissenschaften at the 
University of Göttingen.  As he wrote in the opening pages of his book on Thucydides, in 
combining history (Geschichte) with the state sciences (Staatswissenschaften), he was 
continuing the distinctive approach to these subjects as it had been pioneered by August 
Ludwig Schlözer (1735-1809), Georg Sartorius (1765-1828), and Friedrich Christoph 
                                            
23  Roscher, Review of List, 1196-7. For Roscher’s consideration of the moral and political 
dangers associated with an elaborate division of labour, which drew upon the work of Adam 
Ferguson as well as Smith, see Wilhelm Roscher, System der Volkswirthschaft. Ein Hand- 
und Lesebuch für Geschäftsmänner und Studierend, 5 vols. (Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1854-
94), vol. 1, 84-88. 
24  Roscher, System der Volkswirthschaft, vol. 1, 17, n.  Roscher cited Adam Smith, An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. R. H. Campbell and A. S. 
Skinner, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1976), IV.ii.30 (I.464-5). 
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Dahlmann (1785-1860).25  Although these authors had divergent interests, all three had taught 
Geschichte, Politik and the Staatswissenschaften at Göttingen prior to Roscher, and all three 
shared a common view of the interdependence of history and politics.26  Schlözer insisted on 
the close relationship between history, statistics and politics or the “science of government” 
(Regierungswissenschaft), and laid emphasis on the ability of the historian to integrate, on the 
basis of comparison (Vergleichung), the various historical societies into a single stadial 
scheme.27  Roscher hinted, in a letter of 1842 to Leopold Ranke, that he was building upon 
Schlözer’s comparative approach, and cited Schlözer’s description of statistics as 
“stillstehende Geschichte” in his System der Volkswirtschaft.28  Sartorius was even more 
explicit that history and politics were “inseparable,” claiming that politics – which he sharply 
demarcated from natural law – depended upon exact information about recent history: “The 
role of politics is to order and impart the teachings of history on the constitution and 
                                            
25  Roscher, Thukydides, viii. 
26  For a study that emphasises Roscher’s connection to this tradition, see especially 
Lindenfeld, The Practical Imagination, 154-7.  See also Hans Erich Bödeker, Philippe 
Büttgen and Michel Espagne, eds., Göttingen vers 1800: L’Europe des sciences de l’homme 
(Paris, 2010); Sebastian Manhart, In den Feldern des Wissens: Studiengang, Fach und 
disziplinäre Semantik in den Geschichts- und Staatswissenschaften (1780-1860) (Würzburg, 
2011), 125-270.  Roscher became Privatdozent following Dahlmann’s departure from 
Göttingen after the famous “Göttingen Seven” affair of 1837. On the 1837 affair, see J. M. 
Brophy, “Hanover and Göttingen, 1837,” Victorian Studies Association of Western Canada, 
36 (2010), 9-14. 
27  Schlözer’s claim that statistics and history were inseparable parts of Politik appeared in 
August Ludwig Schlözer, Theorie der Statistik: Nebst Ideen über das Studium der Politik 
überhaupt (Göttingen, 1804), 92-3, 94-5. On Schlözer and his context, see Peter H. Reill, 
“Science and the Science of History in the Spätaufklarung,” in Hans-Erich Bödeker, Georg 
G. Iggers, Jonathan B. Knudsen and Peter H. Reill, eds., Aufklärung und Geschichte: Studien 
zur deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft im 18. Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 1986), 430-51; Luigi 
Marino, Praeceptores Germaniae: Göttingen, 1770-1820 (Göttingen, 1995), 363-81; Martin 
Gierl, Geschichte als präzisierte Wissenschaft (Stuttgart, 2012). On the importance of 
Vergleichung in Schlözer’s work, see Peter Hans Reill, The German Enlightenment and the 
Origins of Historicism (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1975), 198-99. 
28  Roscher, System der Volkswirtschaft, vol. 1, 26.  Wilhelm Roscher to Leopold Ranke 
[1842], in Preussische Jahrbücher, 133 (1908), 384; cited in Reill, The German 
Enlightenment, 199.  
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government of states.”29  It is also worth noting that Roscher’s 1856 work on colonies was 
framed, in part, as a revision of the typology of colonies set out in yet another influential 
Göttingen text: Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren’s Handbuch der Geschichte des 
europäischen Staatensystems und seiner Colonien, first published in 1809.30  Roscher clearly 
associated himself with this broad, Göttingen tradition when he referred to Schlözer and 
Dahlmann as precursors of his own effort to ground the state sciences and politics on the 
foundations of “universal history.”31 
 
These continuities are perhaps most visible in the definitions of politics (Politik) that ran 
through many of Roscher’s works between the 1840s and 1890s.  In his publication on 
Thucydides, for instance, he defined Politik as “the theory of the developmental laws of 
states,” rather than a set of practical rules guiding the statesman.  Echoing Schlözer, he went 
on to argue that Staatswirthschaft and Statistik were especially important and elaborate 
branches of politics.32  He repeated this definition almost verbatim in the 1843 Grundriß.33  
These formulations suggest that Roscher conceived of Staatswirthschaft and Statistik, along 
with Polizeiwissenschaft, Diplomatik, and Völkerrecht, as specialist sciences which were 
subordinate to the master-science of Politik.  In the 1847 Umrisse zur Naturlehre der drei 
Staatsformen, Roscher only slightly modified this terminology.  Here he wrote that his work 
did not deal with “politics in the ordinary sense of the word, but rather the natural theory and 
                                            
29  Georg Sartorius, Einladungs-Blätter zu Vorlesung über die Politik während des Sommers 
1793 (Göttingen, 1793), 21.   
30  A. H. L. Heeren, A Manual of the History of the Political System of Europe and its 
Colonies, from its formation at the close of the fifteenth century, to its re-establishment upon 
the fall of Napoleon, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1834). For Roscher’s references to Heeren, see 
Roscher, Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung (Leipzig and Heidelberg, 1856), 2. 
31  Roscher, Thukydides, viii.  
32  Roscher,Thukydides, vii.  
33  Roscher, Grundriß, 4.  
11 
 
natural description of states.”34  He reiterated the claim that Politik, or Staatswissenschaft in 
general, was concerned with the “developmental laws” of states in the first volume of his 
System der Volkswirthschaft (1854).35  Finally, he claimed in the Politik of 1892 to have been 
engaged in the study of politics in the Aristotelian sense of that word, as a form of historical 
Naturlehre applied to the state, since the very beginning of his academic career.36 
 
This emphasis on the historical character of Politik underpinned a form of stadial history 
which also had roots in Enlightenment Göttingen.  As we have seen, Schlözer had suggested 
that comparison (Vergleichung) between different societies, across time and space, made it 
possible to identify the basic stages through which all societies naturally proceeded.37  
Roscher adopted a similar perspective in distinguishing the various “developmental” or 
“cultural” stages (Entwickelungsstufen; Kulturstufen) through which different peoples 
progressed.  As he noted in the Foreword to his book on Thucydides, the key task of the 
political thinker was to identify the “developmental laws” (Entwicklungsgesetzen) of states 
on the basis of comparison between the distinctive histories of individual peoples.  A firm 
grasp of these laws was an essential part of “universal history” or the “history of mankind.”  
He also argued that the theory of historical stages made it possible to make comparisons 
between different peoples in different times and places, although he cautioned against the 
indiscriminate use of historical analogies.38  Admittedly, Roscher was circumspect in 
identifying the precise stages which marked the progress of civil society, and he never 
attempted a detailed exposition in the manner of the eighteenth-century historians of civil 
                                            
34  Roscher, “Umrisse zur Naturlehre der drei Staatsformen,” Allgemeine Zeitschrift für 
Geschichte, 7 (1847), 457-8, n.  
35  Roscher, System der Volkswirthschaft, 1:22. 
36  Roscher, Politik, iii.  
37  Reill, The German Enlightenment, 198-99.  
38  Roscher, Thukydides, xi-xii.  
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society.  And although he sometimes implied that the laws of stadial development were 
universal, he also hinted that only some nations or peoples – what he called Kulturvölker – 
experienced the complete cycle of cultural development. 
 
Most crucially of all for my argument, Roscher’s conception of “developmental stages” 
rested heavily upon the history of the ancient world.  In his work on Thucydides, he claimed 
that the history of classical antiquity constituted a complete record of the stadial development 
of ancient societies, and could be approached impartially.39  The history of the Athenian and 
Roman republics thus furnished Roscher with crucial evidence about the development of 
political society as it passed from primitive forms of kingly and aristocratic government 
(characteristic of a “medieval” stage), through various monarchical and constitutional 
regimes, and finally ended in military tyranny or Caesarism (which he associated with the 
“higher cultures”).  More urgently, Roscher maintained that the history of the ancient 
republics constituted a parallel, or “analogy,” with that of modern Europe.  This made the 
history of antiquity a critical resource in his appraisal of the prospects facing modern 
Europe’s constitutional states, as well as an “inestimable guide” to their political and 
economic development.40  For example, Roscher suggested that the history of the Athenian 
constitution in the fifth century, characterised by the rise of individual legal equality and an 
increasingly omnipotent state, paralleled similar developments in post-revolutionary 
Europe.41  He underlined the analogies between antiquity and modernity even more explicitly 
in his Umrisse zu Naturlehre der drei Staatsformen, which ended with a long, comparative 
                                            
39  On Roscher’s concern with historical impartiality, see Neville Morley, “Thucydides, 
history and historicism,” 115-39. 
40  Roscher laid emphasis on the parallel between ancient and modern economic history in 
Roscher, Grundriß, iv. In the much later Politik, he entitled one chapter “Analogien aus dem 
Alterthume”; see Roscher, Politik, 304-7. 
41  Roscher, Thukydides, 271.  
13 
 
analysis of the ancient world’s collapse in military despotism and the rise of Napoleon.42  
Perhaps most importantly, he claimed that the violent struggles over property and citizenship 
that occurred in the later Roman republic were analogous to the growing conflicts that were 
emerging between plutocrats and proletariat in the context of the modern “social question.”43  
The history of the ancient republics thus had a pressing relevance for the future of politics in 
Europe’s “higher cultures.” 
 
While one source of this concern may have been late eighteenth-century discussions about 
the rise and decline of states, Roscher’s thinking must also be situated alongside 
contemporary debates in German politics and historiography.  Most obviously, his position 
forms a clear contrast with that of Marx, who scorned the idea of any resemblance between 
the worlds of antiquity and modernity, and would later reject the term “Caesarism” as a kind 
of schoolboy historical anachronism.44  Yet Roscher’s invocation of a parallel between 
modern and ancient history was far from unconventional in the 1840s and 1850s.  Classical 
analogies, whether Greek or Roman, were employed by German political thinkers until well 
into the second half of the century as a means of analysing modern European politics and the 
character of the wider European state system.45  Moreover, Roscher’s specific concern about 
the parallel between ancient and modern class struggle foreshadowed later concerns in 
German “Historical Economics.”  Gustav Schmoller, who is conventionally identified as the 
most significant figure in this context, also underlined the significance of the ancient world’s 
                                            
42  Roscher, Umrisse, 458-9.  
43  Roscher first rehearsed this parallel in detail in his “Betrachtungen über Socialismus und 
Communismus,” (1845), erster Abschnitt, 436-47.  
44  Karl Marx, “Preface to the Second Edition” [1869], The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte (New York, 1963), 7-9.  
45  For contemporary examples of the parallel between the modern European and ancient 
Greek system of states, see Georg Gottfried Gervinus, Einleitung in die Geschichte des 
neunzehnten Jahrhunderts (Leipzig, 1853), 13-14, Constantin Frantz, Untersuchungen über 
das europäische Gleichgewicht (Berlin, 1859), 3-4. 
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social conflicts for understanding the modern “social question” in a number of writings 
around the time of the formation of the Verein für Sozialpolitik in 1873.46  Using the same 
terminology as Roscher, Schmoller warned in 1872 “that all higher cultures, like the Greeks, 
the Romans, and other peoples, have perished through similar antagonisms [Gegensätzen], 
through social class struggles and revolutions, and through their inability to reconcile the 
higher and lower classes.”47  Schmoller amplified the point in his 1874 Die sociale Frage und 
der preußische Staat, reminding his readers of the Roman republic’s transition to 
“Caesarism” or the “dictatorship of the Emperors” and again noting that “all higher cultures 
have perished through such starkly divided social oppositions.”48  Hildebrand, it is true, took 
a different position in his 1869 Die sociale Frage der Vertheilung des Grundeigenthums im 
klassischen Alterthum, in which he concluded that modern forms of credit and mobile 
property meant that nineteenth-century states were unlikely to experience the conflicts that 
had accompanied the agrarian history of antiquity.49  Yet while this reveals a lack of 
consensus on the details, Roscher’s anxieties about the parallel between ancient and modern 
political developments certainly pointed to a larger preoccupation in mid-nineteenth-century 
German scholarship. 
 
 
III 
                                            
46  For an excellent discussion of Schmoller on this issue, see Grimmer-Solem, The Rise of 
Historical Economics, 110-11. 
47  Gustav Schmoller, “Rede zur Eröffnung der Besprechung über die sociale Frage in 
Eisenach, 6. Oktober 1872,” in Schmoller, Zur Social- und Gewerbepolitik der Gegenwart. 
Reden und Aufsätze (Leipzig, 1890), 11. 
48  Schmoller, “Die sociale Frage und der preußische Staat” (1874), in Schmoller, Zur Social- 
und Gewerbepolitik der Gegenwart. Reden und Aufsätze (Leipzig, 1890), 44-5, 61-2. 
49  Bruno Hildebrand, “Die sociale Frage der Vertheilung des Grundeigenthums im 
klassischen Alterthum,” in Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 12 (1869), 1-25, 
139-155.  
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As his insistence on the recurrence of ancient forms of tyranny and Caesarism suggests, 
Roscher’s stadial perspective upon mankind’s successive “developmental stages” was not a 
neutral, or merely “scientific,” inquiry into the character of historical progress.  Rather, his 
thinking about the history of cultures (Kulturgeschichte), with its marked anxieties about the 
rise, decline and fall of the ancient republics, was an integral component of a more urgent 
assessment of the prospects facing the modern states of nineteenth-century Europe.  This 
theme first emerged in some of Roscher’s pieces from the 1840s, beginning with the short, 
but quite illuminating, “On the Formation of State Power in its Contest with Small Juridical 
Persons” (1843), and continuing in the more famous Umrisse zur Naturlehre der drei 
Staatsformen (1847-48).  These two pieces provide evidence of Roscher’s commitment to the 
moderate constitutionalism associated with Dahlmann, and the latter text should probably be 
regarded as an attempt to revise the political typology worked out in Dahlmann’s 1835 
Politik.50  Along with his “Observations on Socialism and Communism” (1845) – to be 
considered separately in the next section – these texts also supply us with insights into the 
intellectual origins of his later inquiry into the connections between democracy and 
Caesarism. 
 
                                            
50  Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann, Die Politik, auf den Grund und das Maaß der gegebenen 
Zustände zurückgeführt (Göttingen, 1835). On Dahlmann, see Lionel Krieger, The German 
Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition (Boston, 1957), 305-9; Charles E. 
McLelland, The German Historians and England: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Views 
(Cambridge, 1971), 80-4; Rudolf von Thadden, “Georg Gottfried Gervinus und Friedrich 
Christoph Dahlmann: Geschichte und Politik,” in Hartmut Boockmann and Hermann 
Wellenreuther, eds., Geschichtswissenschaft in Göttingen (Göttingen, 1987), 186-203; 
Wilhelm Bleek, “Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann und die ‘gute’ Verfassung,” Politische 
Virteljahresschrift, 48 (2007), 28-43; Thomas Becker, Wilhelm Bleek, Tilman Mayer, eds., 
Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann – ein politischer Professor im 19.Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 
2012).   
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A particularly revealing source for understanding Roscher’s thinking about the character of 
the modern European state is his “On the Formation of State Power.”51  Here he described the 
expanding competencies of the modern state as it absorbed the formerly independent powers 
of towns, provinces, churches, guilds, corporations and other “juridical” associations.  The 
article thus offered a kind of brief, theoretical history of the modern state and its rise as the 
sole source of legal and political authority.  The heyday of this process was in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when formerly independent or “exclusive” 
associations were absorbed into, and made legally dependent upon, a centralised or absolute 
state.  Here we can detect the origins of his long-running interest in the history of 
monarchical absolutism.  Roscher described this process in terms of a larger shift from what 
he called the “patrimonial state” (Patrimonialstaat) to the “society state” (Gesellschaftsstaat), 
which accompanied a transition from “private-legal” conceptions of political rule to “social” 
ideas in which the state was conceived as a higher, general interest.52  The pre-eminent 
exemplar of these “social ideas” (gesellschaftlichen Ideen) was Frederick II of Prussia, with 
his famous self-description as the “first servant of the state.”53  The wider implication was 
that monarchical absolutism was the distant predecessor of the modern democratic state, 
since absolutism was the source of modern “ideas of equality” (Gleichheitsideen), the 
eradication of aristocratic ranks, and the progress of centralisation and regularity 
                                            
51  Wilhelm Roscher, “Ueber die Ausbildung der Staatsgewalt im Kampfe mit den kleinen 
juristischen Personen: Eine Abhandlung aus der geschichtlichen Politik,” Neue Jahrbücher 
der Geschichte und Politik, 2 (Leipzig, 1843), 231-63.  
52  Roscher, “Die Ausbildung,” 252. For a near-contemporary usage of Patrimonialstaat, 
counterposed to Republik, see Julius Fröbel, System der Sozialen Politik. Neudruck der 
Ausgabe Mannheim 1847 mit Einleitung von Rainer Koch 2 vols., (Aalen, 1975), vol. 2, 66-
67.  
53  Roscher, “Die Ausbildung,” 253-4.  
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(Centralisation und Regelmäßigkeit).54  He suggested that Karl Ludwig von Haller’s political 
theory of restoration was an attempt to revive the central ideas of the Patrimonialstaat.55 
 
Crucially, Roscher did not think that the shift from the Patrimonialstaat to the 
Gesellschaftstaat was an unqualified change for the better.  He criticised the modern state’s 
tendency to “devour the whole of life,” and offered China as an example of the “complete 
omnipotence of state power.”56  These comments reflect his long-running anxieties about the 
absence of restraints on the power of Europe’s post-revolutionary states, a concern which 
resurfaced in his later writings on Caesarism.  Instead, Roscher argued that political 
flourishing consisted in achieving a balance between the centralising state and the “small 
juridical persons.”57  In support of this preference, he cited Montesquieu’s dictum that 
intermediary powers were essential in preventing monarchy from sliding into either 
democracy or despotism, and singled out England as the European country in which such a 
balance had been achieved.58  This reference to both Montesquieu and to England were fairly 
clear indications of Roscher’s political preferences in 1843, and looked back to the Göttingen 
tradition of Anglophile liberalism that is commonly associated with Dahlmann (who himself 
played a role in the German publication of Jean-Louis Delolme’s Constitution of England in 
1819).59 
 
                                            
54  Roscher, “Die Ausbildung,” 248.  
55  Roscher, “Die Ausbildung,” 253-4. 
56  Roscher, “Die Ausbildung,” 258-59.  
57  Roscher, “Die Ausbildung,” 249.  
58  Roscher, “Die Ausbildung,” 249.  
59  See Jean-Louis Delolme, Die Verfassung von England, dargestellt und mit der 
republicanischen Form und mit andern europäischen Monarchieen verglichen. Mit einer 
Vorrede begleitet von F. C. Dahlmann (Altona, 1819). For Dahlmann’s praise of the English 
constitution, see Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann, “Ein Wort über Verfassung” [1815], in 
Hartwig Brandt, ed., Restauration und Frühliberalismus 1814-1840 (Darmstadt, 1979), 104-
110.   
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Roscher’s more famous 1847 Umrisse zur Naturlehre der drei Staatsformen developed this 
analysis.  In its opening pages, he sought to refute the various alternatives to Aristotle’s 
tripartite classification of state forms that had appeared since the publication of 
Montesquieu’s L’Esprit des Lois in 1748, beginning with Montesquieu himself, and 
continuing with Kant, Fichte, Schleiermacher and K. L. von Haller.  His most interesting 
criticisms, however, were levelled at Rousseau, whom he accused of abandoning any 
fundamental differentiation between forms of state.  According to Roscher, Rousseau’s 
insistence on the distinction between sovereignty and government had enabled him to claim 
that all true constitutions, regardless of their form of government, rested upon an 
“unalienable, indivisible, and unlimited popular sovereignty.”60  Thus for Rousseau, there 
were only “democratic constitutions.”61  Here Roscher was echoing some of the anxieties 
about Rousseau’s Social Contract expressed by earlier German thinkers, such as Heeren, who 
believed that Rousseau had opened the door to the politically-dangerous and incoherent idea 
of a democratically-grounded monarchy.62  Further echoing Dahlmann, Roscher’s alternative 
was a commitment to the classical, Polybian idea of the mixed constitution, which he thought 
found expression in the “constitutional regimes of our own times” (constitutionellen 
Verfassungen unserer Tage).63  
  
                                            
60  Roscher, Umrisse, 79.  
61  Roscher, Umrisse, 79-80. 
62  A. H. L. Heeren, Historical Treatises: The Political Consequences of the Reformation; The 
Rise, progress, and practical influence of political theories; The rise and growth of the 
continental interests of Great Britain (Oxford, D. A. Talboys, 1836), 172-83.  Roscher later 
criticised Rousseau for pointing the way to modern communism in combining criticisms of 
private property (in the Discourse on Inequality) with proposals for unlimited state power (in 
the Social Contract): see Wilhelm Roscher, “Grundzüge einer nationalökonomischen 
Erklärung des Privateigenthums,” Berichte über die Verhandlungen der königlich 
sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig: Philologisch-Historische Classe, 4 
(1852), 111-35 (119, n.).  
63  Roscher, Umrisse, 85.  For Dahlmann’s preference for a mixture of monarchy, aristocracy 
and democracy, see Dahlmann, Politik, 18.  
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Roscher’s aim in the remaining sections of the Umrisse was to describe the entire cycle of 
state-forms, beginning with “free patriarchal kingship” (patriarchalisch-volksfreie 
Königthum), passing through the intermediate stages of “knightly-priestly aristocracy” 
(ritterlich-priesterliche Aristokratie), absolute monarchy, and democracy, and ending with 
the establishment of military tyranny (Militärtyrannie).64  His most significant comments on 
the character of the modern state, however, all appeared in the first section on monarchy.  
Here Roscher engaged more substantially with Montesquieu’s account of monarchy, 
endorsing the French writer’s emphasis on “intermediary powers” but simultaneously 
criticising his identification of “honour” as the principle of monarchical government.65  He 
also echoed Montesquieu, along with many other eighteenth-century thinkers, in holding 
monarchical government to be most compatible with the territorial scale of modern states.  At 
the same time, he elaborated upon some aspects of the story he had laid out in “On the 
Formation of State Power,” significantly expanding his account of the transition from 
“Enlightened” absolutisms of the eighteenth century to nineteenth-century democracy.  
According to Roscher, “Enlightened absolutism” was a third form of absolute monarchy in 
which almost all previous restraints upon the ruler’s power had been eradicated, hence 
unleashing a kind of “state-machine” (in using this term, he may have been echoing earlier 
German critics of the machine-state, such as Johann Gottfried Herder or Wilhelm 
Humboldt).66  There was a strong implication that Europe’s post-revolutionary states were 
descendants of these earlier “state-machines.”67 
 
                                            
64  Roscher, Umrisse, 87-88. 
65  Roscher, Umrisse, 327-8, 331.  
66  Roscher, Umrisse, 452. For an example of Herder’s use of the machine-state metaphor see 
Johann Gottfried Herder, “This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity,” 
in Herder, Philosophical Writings, ed. Michael N. Forster (Cambridge, 2002), 316.  
67  Roscher, Umrisse, 452.   
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This point, however, did not lead to a sustained examination of the nineteenth-century state, 
but to a more general discussion of the collapse of democracy and its replacement with 
military tyranny.  Roscher claimed that military tyranny was a product of the intense social 
antagonisms between “money-oligarchy” (Geldoligarchie) and proletariat that characterised 
degenerate, or “extreme,” democracies.68  Military power became the de facto authority 
within the state as the demagogic and aristocratic leaders of declining republics sought for 
tranquillity at any price.69  If one instance of this was Napoleon Bonaparte, an equally 
weighty historical example was the Roman republic.  Roscher traced the rise of ancient 
Roman pauperism, the struggle between Marius and Sulla, and the rise of Julius Caesar as 
underpinned by the “rule of a mob of soldiers” (Herrschaft des Soldatenpöbels).70  It is 
essential to recognise that Roscher saw this process as playing out in the Europe of the 1840s.  
Noting that the foundations of the French state had been transformed under the reign of Louis 
Philippe, he claimed in 1847 that the July Monarchy was already embarked on the 
transformation from a “monarchical democracy” to an “unlimited military monarchy.”71  
Before the 1848 revolutions, then, Roscher had already begun to identify the democratic 
foundations of modern states as dangerously unstable. 
 
 
IV 
 
                                            
68  Roscher, Umrisse, 88, 458. 
69  Roscher, Umrisse, 458.  
70  Roscher, Umrisse, 459-70.  
71  Roscher, Umrisse, 455.   
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Roscher explored the social dimensions of the problem more fully in his “Remarks on 
Socialism and Communism” (1845).72  In this piece he took Lorenz von Stein’s famous 
Socialismus und Communismus in heutigen Frankreich (1842) and Michel Chevalier’s Cours 
d’économie politique (1842-44) as starting points for reflecting more broadly upon the 
relevance of socialism and communism for nineteenth-century politics.  In this context, he 
developed his own analysis of the tensions unleashed by the combination of plutocracy with 
democracy among modern states.  This sensitivity to the consequences of fusing socio-
economic inequality with a system of democratic legitimation made his discussion a 
contribution to the wider European debate about the “social question,” which had arisen as a 
central topic in French, and then German, thought in the 1830s.73  Yet although he recognised 
the suffering, injustice and instability caused by inequality in modern commercial societies, 
and although he had some sympathy for Chevalier’s “half-way” socialism, he was unable to 
endorse projects that would undermine the foundations of civil society (bürgerliche 
Gesellschaft) – namely, private property and the family.74 
 
Roscher set his analysis of socialism and communism in the context of a broader analysis of 
the instabilities and divisions that plagued economically-advanced societies.75  He depicted 
socialism and communism as almost inevitable ideological by-products of an extended 
                                            
72  Wilhelm Roscher, “Betrachtungen über Socialismus und Communismus,” Zeitschrift für 
Geschichtswissenschaft, III (1845), 418-61, 540-64; IV (1845), 10-28.  
73  On the intellectual, legal and social dimensions of the “social question” see Donald R. 
Kelley and Bonnie G. Smith, “What Was Property? Legal Dimensions of the Social Question 
in France (1789-1848),” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 128 (1984), 
200-30; Hermann Beck, The Origins of the Authoritarian Welfare State in Prussia: 
Conservatives, Bureaucracy, and the Social Question, 1815-70 (Ann Arbor, 1995); Douglas 
Moggach and Paul Leduc Browne, eds., The Social Question and the Democratic Revolution: 
Marx and the Legacy of 1848 (Ottawa, 2000); Grimmer-Solem, The Rise of Historical 
Economics, 89-126. 
74  Roscher, “Betrachtungen,” 418. 
75  Roscher, “Betrachtungen,” 419.  
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division of labour and the inequalities to which it gave rise.  He also lamented the 
increasingly polarized opposition between rich and poor, and the corresponding erosion of 
the middle classes, which he, like many other liberals in Vormärz Germany, saw as a crucial 
foundation of political stability.76  He also pointed to the increasing subdivision of landed 
property, the redundancy of individual workers in an age of machines, the concentration of 
public debts in the hands of fewer creditors, and the increasing frequency of financial crises 
and wars as symptoms of the instabilities unleashed by modern capitalism.77  All this led him 
to a memorable description of the modern state as a centralised, plutocratically-structured 
entity which nevertheless maintained some superficially democratic features:  
 
The disappearance of the middle class, the split between a few extremely rich people 
and an innumerable proletariat, is the principal route by which free and once-
flourishing nations have hastened towards the grave.  This type of money-aristocracy 
(Geldaristokratie) shares all the severity of a genuine aristocracy without any of its 
milder features.  Since money-aristocracy is usually the offspring of a degenerated 
democracy – the more that sovereignty is extended to the rabble (Pöbel), the more it 
can be purchased by the rich – its form cannot radically deviate from the principle of 
equality.  The starving workers are told that there is no legal obstacle preventing them 
from joining the ranks of the capitalists, and from participating in their pleasures.  The 
uniformity and centralisation of the state, which are anathema to a true aristocracy, 
are taken to the highest level: investments (Kapitalien) count more than human 
beings, the joint-stock company (Actiengesellschaft) replaces the old associations.  
                                            
76  On the positive valuation of the Mittelstand by nineteenth-century German liberals, see 
James J. Sheehan, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago, 1978), 25-8.   
77  Roscher, “Betrachtungen,” 422-32. 
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The entirety of life depends on the state, in order that its lords, the men of big money, 
can wholly dominate it.78 
 
Roscher concluded that such societies would experience the same sequence that had played 
out in the Roman republic, as it passed through a phase of conflict between democracy and 
plutocracy before finally reaching military despotism.79  From this perspective, he was 
offering a pessimistic evaluation about the prospects for maintaining democracy under 
conditions of a social war between “money-oligarchy and proletariat” (Geldoligarchie und 
Proletariat).80 
 
Despite this prognosis, Roscher insisted that socialism and communism had no solution to the 
“state-illness” (Staatskrankheit) that now plagued nineteenth-century states.  Rather, he 
suggested that any attempt to establish a community of goods, or to centrally regulate 
production and consumption in line with the proposals set out in Louis Blanc’s Organisation 
du travail (1839), would ultimately lead to the creation of novel form of despotism or 
“Caesaropapism.”81  His dismissal of socialist and communist ideas as a viable antidote to 
modernity’s problems is further revealed in his engagement with Lorenz von Stein’s 
Socialismus und Communismus des heutigen Frankreichs, which took up much of the second 
part of the article.  Stein’s book, one of the earliest German discussions of the “socialism” of 
Charles Fourier and Henri de Saint-Simon, was among the most important contemporary 
analyses of the social question and the political prospects for modern industrial societies.  
Stein claimed that the next major European revolution, unlike the French Revolution, would 
                                            
78  Roscher, “Betrachtungen,” 433. 
79  Roscher, “Betrachtungen,” 436-47.  
80  Roscher, “Betrachtungen,” 445. 
81  Roscher, “Betrachtungen,” 451. Louis Blanc, Organisation du Travail (Paris, 1841). 
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be a “social revolution,” driven by the modern proletariat, which for Stein constituted a 
distinctive new propertyless class.82  Aside from Roscher’s initial complaint that Stein’s work 
was rendered less impressive by its reliance on Hegelian language, he went on to reject 
Stein’s argument that the proletariat had no parallel in any earlier period, claiming that even a 
cursory glance at Greek and Italian history suggested otherwise.83  More generally, Roscher 
took the opportunity provided by Stein’s work to reiterate the dangers posed by communist 
ideas to a “liberal” civil society.84  Every concession to communism, he argued, was a 
betrayal of “true freedom and true order” (der wahren Freiheit und wahren Ordnung).  This 
led him to underline the compatibility between communism and despotism: 
 
Where communism is fully developed, its supporters will be satisfied with the state-
form which can offer them the most.  For the present at least this can only be an 
arbitrary despotism (rücksichtsloser Despotismus).  If they can be made to support 
every revolution (Umwälzung) easily, then they can certainly be made to support a 
despotic one.  Remember that Emperor Nero was the idol of the Roman rabble 
(Pöbel). And on the other hand, once communism places all the goods of life under 
threat, then the propertied classes will also be compelled to cling onto anything which 
can guarantee them against it, and it’s quite possible that the very power they turn to 
for support will smash their own political freedom.  Stein has very clearly indicated 
the sheer dreadfulness (Entsetzlichkeit) of this general internal conflict, to which a 
general dissemination of communist ideas must inevitably lead, and which in France, 
                                            
82  Lorenz von Stein, Der Socialismus und Communismus des heutigen Frankreichs: Ein 
Beitrag zur Zeitgeschichte (Leipzig), iii.  
83  Roscher, “Betrachtungen,” 544.  
84  Roscher, “Betrachtungen,” 547, 549. 
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in particular, is not tempered by a belief in either the state or in religion. A bellum 
omnium contra omnes, precisely in the Hobbesian sense! (ganz nach Hobbes Art!)85 
 
Roscher went on to argue that the expanding competencies of modern states in terms of 
welfare provision, education, poor relief and security meant that they were much closer to the 
ideals of “community” (Gemeinschaft) than could possibly have been imagined a century 
earlier.86  While he recognised the utility of such institutions, he hinted at his earlier thesis 
that the modern state had become dangerously omnipotent and threatened to stifle progress.  
His other concluding remarks concerned the dangers of overpopulation, which Roscher 
consistently ranked among the gravest problems facing modern states.  As a remedy to this 
problem, he proposed a programme of emigration and colonisation modelled on England’s 
colonial empire, and cited the work of Edward Gibbon Wakefield.87  This idea received much 
fuller elaboration in Roscher’s 1856 Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung, in which 
he called for the emigration of the “propertyless” as a means of mitigating the explosive 
political (and moral) consequences of overpopulation, with its ensuing enviousness, 
competitiveness and social strife.88  It is worth noting that even in this work, Roscher was 
partly motivated by his perception of the instabilities that accompanied the combination of 
“untenable popular rule” (unhaltbar gewordenen Volksherrschaft) with a money-oligarchy 
                                            
85  Roscher, “Betrachtungen,” 549. This famous Hobbesian trope, it is worth noting, 
reappeared in Roscher’s later depiction of Caesarism.   
86  Roscher, “Betrachtungen,” 12-13.  
87  Roscher, “Betrachtungen,” 19. On Wakefield, see Bernard Semmel, The Rise of Free 
Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy and the Empire of Free Trade and 
Imperialism 1750-1850 (Cambridge, 1970), 76-129; Karen O’Brien, “Colonial Emigration, 
Public Policy, and Tory Romanticism, 1783-1830,” in Duncan Kelly, ed., Lineages of 
Empire: The Historical Roots of British Imperial Thought (Oxford/British Academy, 2009), 
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88  Roscher, Kolonien, 38, 344-45, 358. On the intellectual context, see Fitzpatrick, Liberal 
Imperialism, 59-61. 
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(Geldoligarchie) in European states.89  Seen from this perspective, Roscher was proposing 
colonial emigration as a means of solving the “social question” and neutralising its most 
destructive political effects. 
 
Several of these ideas resurfaced in a text on property which first appeared in 1852, and 
which was subsequently reworked for the first volume of the System der Staatswirthschaft.90  
Yet this piece contains some additional material that takes us further into Roscher’s 
understanding of property, civil society and the threat of socialism.  Interestingly, Roscher 
rejected Hobbes’s claim that private property was created by the state, as well as Proudhon’s 
suggestion that property should be regulated by needs, and instead expressed his preference 
for Locke’s account of the origins of property.91  But he also extended his analysis of the 
economic and political origins of communism.  After repeating his earlier point that 
communism took root in polarized societies with an advanced division of labour, he went on 
to link communism to the rising power of the masses (Pöbel) and the democratic principle of 
equality:  
 
Communism is the not inconsistent exaggeration of the democratic principle of 
equality.  Men who regularly hear themselves described as the sovereign people, and 
                                            
89  Roscher, Kolonien, 97.  
90  Wilhelm Roscher, “Grundzüge einer nationalökonomischen Erklärung des 
Privateigenthums,” in Berichte über die Verhandlungen der königlich sächsischen 
Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig: Philologisch-Historische Classe, 4 (1852), 111-
35. 
91  Roscher summarised Locke’s account of property as a theory of legitimate acquisition 
conferred by labour, referring to John Locke, Second Treatise, in Two Treatises of 
Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, 1988), 285-302 (§25-51). Roscher, “Grundzüge,” 
113, n.  
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their will as the highest law of the state, are likely to experience even more keenly the 
gap between their own misery and the abundance of others.92 
 
Roscher’s argument was that political democratisation went hand-in-hand with the state’s 
increasing responsibility for the subsistence needs of the poor.  The dangers of this trajectory 
were revealed by the history of ancient republics, which provided a clear illustration of the 
tendency of egalitarian democracy to promote the expansion of state power and, ultimately, 
the rise of despotism.93  This dynamic remained at the heart of Roscher’s analysis into the 
1890s. 
 
 
V 
 
We are now in a position to better understand the relationship between democracy and 
Caesarism that was one of the major themes that Roscher explored in his later writings of the 
1880s and early 1890s.  In this period he published two dedicated studies of democracy and 
Caesarism, along with a separate piece on absolute monarchy, that were subsequently 
incorporated into his Politik (1892).  As he mentioned in the Preface to the Politik, all of 
these works were continuous with his earlier aim of adapting Aristotle’s typology of state-
forms to an understanding of modern politics.94  At the same time, the Politik can also be 
situated within the longer tradition of German writings on “politics” stretching back to the 
eighteenth-century formulations of Achenwall and Schlözer, and advancing, in particular, in 
                                            
92  Roscher, “Grundzüge,” 116.  
93  Roscher, “Grundzüge,” 116-7, n.  
94  Roscher, Politik, iii. 
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Dahlmann’s 1835 Politik (which Roscher explicitly cited as a model).95  Nevertheless, these 
later writings can also be interpreted as continuing Roscher’s earlier inquiry into the tensions 
between centralised state power, democratic legitimacy, and socio-economic inequality in 
nineteenth-century states.  They should also be seen as vital contributions to the late-
nineteenth-century German (and European) debate about democracy and Caesarism. 
 
In order to grasp Roscher’s own contribution to that debate, it is necessary to briefly rehearse 
the German debate about Caesarism as it developed in the four decades after Louis 
Bonaparte’s 1851 coup d’état.  The 1850s witnessed an explosion of German writing on the 
nature of Caesarism (or Bonapartism), as a wide range of thinkers, such as Constantin Frantz, 
Bruno Bauer, Karl Marx, Julius Fröbel, A. L. Rochau and Lorenz von Stein (among others), 
examined Napoleon III’s imperial regime and sought to assess its relevance for European 
politics.  While they differed on many issues of terminology and substance, these thinkers 
generally agreed in defining Caesarism as a political regime that abolished individual and 
constitutional liberties while maintaining a veneer of democratic legitimacy and catering for 
the material needs of the masses.96  Nevertheless, divergent interpretations and emphases 
appeared among liberal, socialist and conservative contributors to the debate in the 1860s and 
1870s, as the issue became intertwined with wider questions about the structure of the 
German Reich, the introduction of universal suffrage, the place of the Kaiser within the 
constitution, and the stability of the wider European state system.  Some thinkers, such as the 
Swiss political theorist Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, depicted Caesarism as a kind of benevolent 
autocracy which satisfied the material needs of the “fourth estate” but which also stifled 
                                            
95  Roscher, Politik, iv. 
96  For discussion, see the works listed in n.5 above.   
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individual self-development.97  Others, such as Heinrich von Treitschke, claimed that the 
German states, with their distinctive traditions of self-government, federalism and kingship, 
would remain exempt from the mixture of revolutionary democracy and neo-Roman 
imperialism which characterised France.98  By contrast, some critics of the emerging German 
Reich in the late 1860s identified the combination of universal suffrage with Prussia’s 
military dominance in the North German Confederation as a potential new source of 
Caesarism.99   
 
It is impossible to understand Roscher’s own contribution to this debate without first 
reconstructing the larger analysis of democracy upon which it rested.  In his Umrisse zur 
Naturlehre der Demokratie (1890), which reappeared in expanded form in the fourth Book of 
the Politik, he offered a wide-ranging account of democracy in its ancient and modern guises, 
and subsequently explored the divergent forms of democratic politics in Britain, France, and 
the United States.  This material provides the essential framework for making sense of 
Roscher’s assessment of the social and political origins of Caesarism, and also reveals that 
the relationship between democracy and Caesarism was more nuanced than is recognised in 
                                            
97  Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, “Cäsar und Cäsarismus,” in Bluntschli, Staatswörterbuch in 
drei Bänden, 3 vols. (Zürich, 1869), 1:391-2. 
98  Treitschke argued that the permanent military domination of “Cäsarismus” was 
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vols. (6th ed., Leipzig, 1903), II.83; see also Heinrich von Treitschke, “Frankreichs 
Staatsleben und der Bonapartismus” [1865-71], in Treitschke, Historische und politische 
Aufsätze, 3 vols. (6th ed., Leipzig, 1903), III.48-53.   
99  Constantin Frantz, Die Naturlehre des Staates als Grundlage aller Staatswissenschaft 
(Leipzig and Heidelberg, 1870), 172-6. Social democrats, such as Wilhelm Liebknecht, 
claimed that Bismarck was copying Napoleonic Caesarism in using universal suffrage as a 
tool of reaction: see Wilhelm Liebknecht, “On the political position of social democracy, 
particularly with regard to the Reichstag” [1869], in Liebknecht, Wilhelm Liebknecht and 
German Social Democracy: A Documentary History, ed. William A. Pelz, trans. Erich Hahn, 
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Peter Baehr’s brief account of Roscher.100  On the one hand, Roscher criticised those who 
facilely equated democracy with freedom, or expected its inevitable triumph in nineteenth-
century Europe.  One of his targets on both these counts was the British Whig writer and 
politician, Henry Brougham, who – according to Roscher – had failed to appreciate the 
possibility that an unpropertied majority, under conditions of universal suffrage, could 
threaten property rights and lend their support to Caesarist leaders.101  But on the other hand, 
Roscher distinguished himself from extreme critics of democracy like Henry Maine.102  This 
suggests that, for him, Caesarism was not an inevitable consequence of democratisation, and 
that certain modern forms of democratic government might have the capacity to forestall the 
usual shift from democracy to military tyranny. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Roscher identified representative government as the key to avoiding 
the transition to Caesarism that had taken place in the ancient world and, more recently, in the 
aftermath of the French Revolution.  He made a strong distinction between “autocratic” and 
“representative” forms of popular government (Volksherrschaft), and claimed that the latter 
was superior for large, modern democracies.103  Citing Mommsen’s Roman History, he 
explained that Rome’s failure lay precisely in its inability to transform the constitution of a 
city-state into a properly representative system, as appropriate for a large empire.104  Roscher 
also admired federal institutions as an additional means of rendering democracy stable in the 
modern world.  Referring to both Montesquieu’s description of a “federal republic” and to 
The Federalist, he explained that federal republics survived longer than unitary states.105  
                                            
100  Baehr, Caesar and the Fading of the Roman World, 226-32. 
101  Roscher, Politik, 6.  
102  Roscher was critical of Henry Sumner Maine, Popular Government: Four Essays 
(London, 1885); see Roscher, Politik, 454, n.   
103  Roscher, Politik, 311, 347-53. 
104  Roscher, Politik, 311.  
105  Roscher, Politik, 454.  
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Both these points underpinned Roscher’s comparative evaluation of the American and French 
experience of democracy since the end of the eighteenth century.  While the United States 
had created a stable, federal republic, the French had failed to construct a genuinely 
representative form of democratic politics.  Indeed, Roscher argued that French politics since 
1789 was better described as “revolutionary” rather than “democratic,” because its essential 
feature was the rule of well-organized minority groups.106 
 
Despite this emphasis on the effectiveness of representation and federation in conferring 
political stability, Roscher remained anxious that the democratic principle of equality 
(Gleichheitsprincip) might prepare the way for the domination of the masses and, ultimately, 
Caesarism.  Echoing Aristotle and Montesquieu, he argued that a key threat to all 
democracies was a tendency to enforce an extreme conception of equality which refused to 
recognise differences of talent, merit or virtue.  He claimed that it was “under the mask of 
general equality” that the most oppressive forms of domination (e.g. the poor over the rich, or 
the majority over the minority) came to be realised.107  The basic process he diagnosed, 
which was based on the history of Athens and Rome, was of a shift from mixed forms of 
constitutional government that combined democratic freedoms with aristocratic prudence, to 
a more “extreme” or “unlimited” form of democracy based on purely numerical 
representation and the domination of the masses.108  One key term here was Kopfzahlstaat – 
literally the “head-count state” – a term used by other contemporary thinkers in identifying 
the dangers implicit in universal suffrage.109  It is worth observing that Roscher’s thinking 
                                            
106  Roscher, Politik, 454-55.  
107  Roscher, Politik, 320.  
108  Roscher, Politik, 418, 448. 
109  Roscher, Politik, 333. For a near-contemporary worry about the transformation of the 
European Rechtsstaat into a Kopfzahlstaat see Jacob Burckhardt, Historische Fragmente, aus 
dem Nachlass gesammelt von Emil Dürr (Stuttgart, 1942), 46; for an English translation see 
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here owed more than one might expect to earlier French discussions of the nexus between 
egalitarian democracy and despotic power, beginning with Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws 
(1748) and continuing in Tocqueville’s attack on the Caesarism of Napoleon I and III.  Both 
these thinkers had argued that the drive towards extreme equality, or the levelling of 
intermediary powers, paved the way for the emergence of a despotic state.110  Roscher fleshed 
out these themes in his discussion of democracy in the Politik, claiming (à la Montesquieu) 
that “developed” democracies fostered an extreme form of equality that left no room for 
intermediary powers, ranks or provincial bodies, and maintaining (à la Tocqueville) that the 
drive to equality under the ancien régime monarchies had prepared the way for modern 
revolutionary democracy.111  Roscher’s depiction of the emergence of Caesarism from a 
combination of a democratic drive to equality and political centralization thus broadly 
resembled these more famous contributions to the understanding of modern despotism. 
 
This more nuanced perspective is reinforced by Roscher’s evaluation of the diverging 
prospects for democracy and Caesarism in Britain and the United States.  Although he 
recognised that England remained a limited democracy in practice, he also noted that the 
power of the Commons was theoretically almost absolute, making England an “scarcely 
                                            
Jacob Burckhardt, Judgments on History and Historians, trans. Harry Zohn (Indianapolis, 
1999), 52. 
110  On this tradition in French thought, see for example Melvin Richter, “Tocqueville and 
French Nineteenth-Century Conceptions of the Two Bonapartes and their Empires,” in Peter 
Baehr and Melvin Richter, eds., Dictatorship in History and Theory (Cambridge, 2004), 83-
102; Annelien de Dijn, French Political Thought from Montesquieu to Tocqueville: Liberty in 
a Levelled Society (Cambridge, 2008); Paul A. Rahe, Soft Despotism, Democracy’s Drift: 
Montesquieu, Rousseau, Tocqueville, and the Modern Prospect (New Haven, CT., 2009). 
111  Roscher, Politik, 316, 590. Tocqueville underlined the ease with which “democratic 
equality” could result in a Roman-style imperial regime in his notes to the unfinished part of 
The Old Regime and the Revolution; see Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution: 
Volume Two: Notes on the French Revolution and Napoleon, ed. François Furet and 
Françoise Mélonio, trans. Alan Kahan (Chicago, 2001), 248-50.  
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limited democracy” (sehr wenig beschränkte Demokratie).112  Roscher thought that the 
expansion of the franchise in 1867 constituted a genuine revolution in English politics, 
unimaginable to the likes of Montesquieu or Blackstone.  Propertyless workers now made up 
the majority of the electorate, while the various powers of the state were now concentrated in 
the House of Commons.  Roscher hinted that the widened franchise, the centralisation of state 
power, and the confusion of executive and legislative functions meant that England was 
moving towards “extreme democracy” and possibly to Caesarism.113   This view, it is worth 
noting, aligned Roscher with larger shifts in the German discourse on Caesarism between the 
1880s and 1920s.  While German thinkers between 1848 and about 1871 had typically seen 
Caesarism as a French phenomenon, later writers including Bruno Bauer, Max Weber, and 
Ferdinand Tönnies were more inclined to discern Caesarist tendencies emerging from the mix 
of plebiscitary or demagogic party politics and Parlamentarismus in the English state.114 
 
In contrast to this negative evaluation of England, Roscher argued that although America paid 
lip-service to popular sovereignty, its federal structure ensured that no single power could 
really be deemed sovereign.115  Questioning the more pessimistic judgement about America’s 
future as a democracy set out in the second volume of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, 
                                            
112  Roscher, Politik, 332-3, 337, n. 
113  Roscher, Politik, 440.  
114  Most famously, see Max Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics” [1919], in 
Weber, Political Writings, ed. Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs (Cambridge, 1994), 340-44; 
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he claimed that the country had returned to a healthier condition in the two decades since the 
end of the Civil War.116  In developing this point, he was responding to a letter of T. B. 
Macaulay to Henry Randall, written in 1857 but reprinted in the Southern Literary Messenger 
in 1860.  In his letter, Macaulay had voiced his belief that “purely democratic” institutions 
must inevitably destroy liberty, civilization or both, and argued that that the distinctive 
geographical features and economic conditions of the United States by no means immunized 
the country against the rise of demagogic leaders: “Either some Caesar or Napoleon will seize 
the reins of government with a strong hand; or your Republic will be as fearfully plundered 
and laid waste by barbarians in the twentieth century as the Roman Empire was in the 
fifth…”.117  Roscher’s response to all this doom-mongering was one of measured optimism, 
grounded partly in his confidence about the stability of federal republics and partly on wider 
claims about the economic capacity and geography of the United States.118  Although, in a 
remarkable passage, he explained that a combination of immigration, population growth, and 
territorial conquest in Latin America might promote Caesarism in the very distant future, and 
although he hinted that Andrew Jackson had flirted with Caesarism, the larger upshot of his 
remarks was that the United States’ almost unlimited capacity for industrial and commercial 
development, along with its enormous territory, would provide a safety-valve against the 
social dislocations that were fuelling Caesarist politics in Europe.119  He also argued that the 
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strength of the presidency vis-à-vis the legislature was a strength of the American system, 
especially when compared to the weak presidency of the French Third Republic.120 
 
This account of democracy forms the essential background to Roscher’s discussion of 
Caesarism, which he defined as a post-democratic regime-type that still maintained some 
democratic elements.  He thus resisted the indiscriminate usage of the term “Caesarism” to 
describe any form of arbitrary, one-man rule, and instead endorsed Emile Littré’s definition 
of the term as “princes elevated to government by democracy, but invested with absolute 
power” (princes portés au gouvernement par la démocratie, mais revétus d’un pouvoir 
absolu).121  He also characterised Caesarism as a distinctive mixture of “extreme 
monarchical” and “extreme democratic” components; this Janus-faced character was one of 
its most distinctive features and strengths.122  Roscher also indicated the proximity between 
democracy and Caesarism in further comments on political representation.  As he underlined, 
Caesarist leaders drew their legitimacy from their claim to “represent” the people or nation.  
His main example of this tendency was Napoleon I, who had presented himself as an 
alternative to more conventional representative assemblies or legislative bodies.  Thus 
Caesarism was a regime in which popular sovereignty was formally sanctioned, yet was in 
practice alienated to a single individual.123  Finally, Caesarism maintained the “equality 
principle” (Gleichheitsprinzip) that Roscher had already identified as the core of democracy.  
Citing Treitschke’s 1861 essay “Die Freiheit,” Roscher insisted that equality could be as 
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compatible with political slavery as with freedom.124  The commitment to abstract equality 
among eighteenth-century French thinkers like Helvétius made them intellectual forerunners 
of Caesarism.125  
 
One further significant feature of Roscher’s analysis was its sensitivity to what we might call 
the social dimensions of Caesarism.  Like Bluntschli (and many others), he described 
agrarian reform, grain distribution, poor relief (Armenpflege) and the emancipation of slaves 
as strategies by which Caesarist leaders maintained their authority.126  It was this that made 
popular leaders like the Gracchi or Saturninus the true precursors of Caesarism in republican 
Rome.  Moreover, Roscher continued to insist that a major driver of Caesarism was the rise 
of deep social antagonisms within democratic states.  He positioned his earlier concern about 
plutocrats and proletariat within the larger, Aristotelian-Polybian-inspired account of the 
transmutations of constitutions: 
 
Democracy finally degenerates: the middle-class, upon which it depends, melts 
(schmiltz) from above and below to become ever narrower; the people (das Volk) 
splits itself in an opposition between very rich capitalists and completely propertyless 
workers.  I term the resulting situation (Zustand) plutocracy with the reverse-side of 
proletariat.  Finally, the entire cycle comes to an end with the establishment of a new 
monarchy, the military tyranny, which we term Caesarism, after its greatest 
representative.127 
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Roscher made no attempt to connect his discussion of Caesarism to an analysis of German 
politics in the late nineteenth century.  This may have been a manifestation of his 
commitment to the impartial, scientific style of German “Historical Economics,” and it is 
possible that he was implicitly identifying threats to the stability of the German Kaiserreich.  
The period was witnessing increasing concern about German Caesarism among political 
thinkers and publicists, ranging from Ludwig Quidde’s notorious attack on Wilhelm II in his 
1894 Caligula, to Max Weber’s anxieties, in his 1895 Inaugural, about the political 
infantilisation of Germany’s political class that he thought was a legacy of Bismarck’s 
Caesarism.128  Nevertheless, Roscher himself explicitly mentioned only Britain and France as 
the two countries most vulnerable to modern Caesarism.  As we have already seen, Roscher 
identified Britain as a kind of extreme democracy that had a real potential for Caesarism.  
Interestingly, he also discerned intellectual currents in British political discourse that 
favoured the replacement of parliamentary government with a new kind of executive-centred 
republicanism; his main example of this was the English Comtean, Frederick Harrison, with 
his admiration for powerful statesmen like Cromwell.129  At the same time, he continued to 
underline France’s deeply ingrained tendencies towards Caesarism, claiming that even if 
legitimate monarchy was restored in the 1890s, it would still retain many Caesarist features.  
He also identified statesmen (Thiers) and theorists (Comte) as sharing a basic inclination for 
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Caesarism.130  Slightly disappointingly, Roscher never clarified the relevance of these 
dynamics for understanding Germany’s own prospects.   
 
 
VI 
 
This article has suggested that historians might be better equipped to understand the 
coherence of Roscher’s thought by laying less emphasis on his place within the history of 
political economy (conceived as a series of methodological or doctrinal innovations), and by 
paying more attention to the full range of his concerns from the 1840s onwards.  Like any 
other political or economic thinker, Roscher deserves to be understood on his own terms, and 
this entails that we should, at least initially, try to move beyond the criticisms of Marx (or 
Max Weber), who of course had their own intellectual agendas.131  One outcome of this 
approach has been to problematize the conventional assumption that Roscher’s work 
represented a fundamental schism with the intellectual worlds of the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment.  As the evidence of his writings from the 1840s clearly attests, he did not 
share List’s or Hildebrand’s denigration of Smith as a “cosmopolitical” or unhistorical 
thinker, and was deeply sympathetic to the projected reconciliation of history, economics and 
politics among his predecessors in Enlightenment Göttingen.  A similar point could be made 
about Roscher’s engagement with eighteenth-century giants like Montesquieu and Rousseau, 
who provided essential reference-points in his evaluation of the prospects for democratic 
sovereignty, constitutional government and modern despotism.  The standard ways of 
                                            
130  Roscher, Politik, 714.  
131  Weber’s methodological critique of Roscher can be found in Max Weber, Roscher and 
Knies: The Logical Problems of Historical Economics, trans. Guy Oakes (New York and 
London, 1975).  
39 
 
understanding Roscher’s relationship with eighteenth-century discourses of politics, which 
have been deeply shaped by old interpretative paradigms about the impact of nationalism and 
historicism on nineteenth-century intellectual history, thus require readjustment. 
 
More fundamentally, the effort to understand Roscher on his own terms has revealed a 
remarkable consistency in his central political concerns over his exceptionally long academic 
career.  As I have argued throughout, his political writings are best understood as parts of a 
coherent inquiry into the prospects of the modern European state as it confronted the 
challenges of mass democracy, social inequality, and intellectual conflict.  One important 
conclusion is that Roscher’s examination of democracy and Caesarism, published between 
1888 and 1892, was simply the latest rendering of his much earlier concern, stretching back 
to the early 1840s, that the structure of the post-revolutionary European state housed a 
capacity to reignite the military tyrannies and despotisms that succeeded the ancient republics 
of Greece and Rome.  The body of this article has detailed the ways in which class conflict, 
overpopulation, socialism, communism, mass politics, social polarization, colonization, 
plutocracy and egalitarian democracy fed into this overarching assessment.  Most importantly 
of all, Roscher proclaimed the incompatibility between modern democracy, with its 
commitment to the principles of equality and popular sovereignty, and the sharp inequalities 
that characterised Europe’s economically-advanced states.  It was this disjunction between 
the political and the social (or economic) that rendered the modern state vulnerable to 
Caesarism.  All this helps further explain the importance that Roscher attached to 
Staatswirthschaft as a political science, and why he insisted on its potential as a tool for 
maintaining political stability. 
 
40 
 
One final conclusion concerns Roscher’s place on the shifting map of nineteenth-century 
European liberalism(s).132  As I have noted, his commitment to maintaining a flourishing 
middle-class, along with his early enthusiasm for the constitutionelle Verfassung and the 
English model of constitutional monarchy, are markers of his sympathy for the Hanoverian 
tradition of German liberalism that found its most famous expression in the writings of 
Dahlmann.  Roscher’s later scepticism about the capacity of the English state to avoid the 
trajectory leading from an extreme, unitary democracy to Caesarism, and his faith in the 
United State’s distinctive mixture of representative government, federal institutions and 
economic dynamism, can be aligned with a more critical verdict on the British polity that 
characterised much German thought from around the middle of the 1870s.  From this 
perspective, Roscher’s changing evaluation of Britain, combined with his consistently critical 
judgement on France, corresponded with some of the larger patterns in German liberalism in 
the second half of the nineteenth century.  Yet one important additional argument of this 
article has been that Roscher shared a great deal of what is often regarded as a distinctively 
French perspective on the dangers of a levelling, egalitarian democracy, and frequently 
echoed Tocqueville’s more famous thesis that the legacies of monarchical absolutism held the 
key to understanding modern democratic republics.  Roscher’s political thought may, 
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therefore, be understood as articulating larger nineteenth-century anxieties about the dangers 
that an extreme commitment to democratic equality posed to constitutional stability in post-
revolutionary Europe.  This confirms that a purely German perspective on Roscher’s thought 
is far too narrow, and gives us yet another reason to be sceptical towards overarching 
categories like the “German Historical School of Economics.” 
